Eugene Finkel's latest work, "To Kill Ukraine," explores Russia’s history of violence in Ukraine and will be published by Basic Books in summer 2024. Besides publishing in academic journals and edited volumes, Finkel’s articles and op-eds have appeared in The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Foreign Affairs and other outlets. DER STANDARD spoke to him about his theories.

STANDARD: Professor Finkel, for 21 months, the country in which you were born has been waging a defensive battle against Russia, while the country in which you grew up for a large part is at war with Hamas. How are you doing at the end of 2023?

Finkel: Not particularly well, thanks for asking. Still, of course, I am also very aware that the "not particularly well" I am feeling is nothing compared to the physical danger that people in Ukraine, Israel, and Gaza are experiencing.

STANDARD: Concerning Ukraine, in the US and Western and Central Europe, the catchphrase "war fatigue" now seems to have found its way into the standard repertoire of many politicians and commentators. At the same time, most decision-makers in D.C., London, Berlin, Paris, and other capitals appear to be aware Russia is betting on time in the hope public opinion in the countries whose governments support Ukraine will turn against them. What does the status quo look like from your perspective?

Finkel: The status quo is the worst possible outcome. Kicking the can down the road, hoping that something might change, is just magical thinking. The war will continue, people will keep dying, and refugees will not return home. Ukraine will not be rebuilt, and autocrats – Russia, Iran, China etc. – will only grow stronger and more emboldened. Nothing will change for the better until the West decides it needs to change and acts accordingly. However, it is not just "war fatigue" or "Ukraine fatigue." It is also the news cycle. The war in Gaza, the election in the Netherlands – the attention naturally shifts away from Ukraine, which is precisely what Putin wants and needs because, for him, freezing the conflict is tantamount to tactical victory. After that, Putin will try to achieve a strategic victory, and Russia will again try to subjugate Ukraine either through military action or politics. Western "war fatigue" also means we will keep having war in Europe for many more years. Ukraine will pay the highest price, but I don't think decision-makers in the EU understand the price the EU will have to pay as well. It is not ready for a long war on its borders.

STANDARD: Meanwhile in the US, most Republicans appear to have no issues with making territorial concessions to Russia. At the same time, Democrats do not seem to agree on what kind of victory for Ukraine they want. At the same time, there is a growing sentiment in Ukraine that the US is giving its armed forces too little to live on but too much to die; a sentiment perhaps best reflected in the latest, much-quoted analysis published in "The Economist" by General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the AFU’s Commander-in-Chief. Can you relate to this view?

Finkel: My impression is that there is a clear understanding in the US, at least in the Biden administration, and the EU that Ukraine should not lose in the sense of being swallowed or entirely subjugated by Russia. But there is also a fear of what Russia might do if it loses too badly. Of course, this might change if Trump or someone similar to him wins the presidential election next year. If that happens, all bets are off. But for now, the focus is on managing the war, rather than finishing it and I can definitely relate to the sentiment expressed by General Zaluzhny. From the early stages of the war, it was clear that eventually, Ukraine would get the Leopard tanks and the F-16s it asked for, but the time it took to get there cost Ukraine dearly.

STANDARD: Although you have consistently pointed out we should be cautious using the term genocide, particularly in the media, you were one of the first academic analysts of note to call Russia's war of aggression precisely that. However, explaining your thinking in spring 2022, you said: "I don't think the Russians went in with that intention, but it has evolved." What do you mean by that?

Finkel: Yes, I called it a genocide already in early April 2022. I do not believe Putin planned to destroy Ukrainians as a national group. Based on what we know, had Ukraine surrendered in February 2022, I think it would have been subjugated, there would have been regime change, destruction of Ukrainian national identity and culture, and likely the physical murder of Ukraine’s political and social elites. Still, there would not have been mass murder. But when Ukrainians resisted and refused to join the "Russian World," the rhetoric of the Russian government and the media and the behavior of the Russian troops on the ground shifted to destroying Ukrainians as a group, as revenge for rejecting what Russians perceive to be the natural order of things. That is, one in which Russians and Ukrainians are parts of the bigger whole and Ukrainians are "Little Russians." The nature of violence shifted during the war. It is a genocide, but it was not predetermined.

STANDARD: Today, the term genocide is also often used in connection with Israel's war against Hamas by supporters on both sides. What do you make of that?

Finkel: It is evident to me that if Hamas had the ability, it would have happily massacred all Israelis, which means not just the Israeli Jews. It did not do so only because it was stopped. And it is obvious to me that on the Israeli side there are quite a few people who would have gladly turned the Gaza Strip into a giant football field, and they are not shy talking about it in public. It is also clear to me that the Israeli military, by and large, does not prioritize limiting civilian deaths during its operations. This is the basis of the argument that Israel is committing genocide in the Gaza Strip: the significant civilian death toll, mainly as the result of artillery and air strikes and eliminationist language among parts of Israeli society and its political class. I understand the logic but I beg to differ. Genocide, according to its legal definition, is "actions, taken with the intent to destroy" the protected group "as such".

STANDARD: So where does the accusation of genocide against Israel come from?

Finkel: Of course, genocide is not just a legal term but also a moral and a political one, and people use it to try to make sense of horrible violence or to influence public opinion. But this is a political and moral discussion not constrained by legal definitions, and I will leave this to activists, politicians, or those making moral arguments. Now, let's take a step back. If you are a civilian in Gaza or Ukraine who is getting killed, it does not matter to you and should not matter whether you are killed in a genocide or as a result of a war crime. Killing civilians is wrong, and civilians do not deserve to die in wars. Where the distinction between genocide and war crimes or crimes against humanity does matter is for external actors who try to understand the causes of this violence and wish to minimize its impact. But all violence against civilians is horrible and wrong, regardless of whether it meets the legal definitions of genocide or not.

STANDARD: In a Q&A marking the one-year anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, you said what surprised you most about Ukraine's response to the war was not so much the civil activism against it, as the country has always had a great tradition of civic engagement, but the fact that all levels of state government, from the federal down to the regional and local administrations, have continued to function despite all odds. Are we still underestimating Ukrainian statehood, particularly the EU member states that argue against Ukraine's membership?

Finkel: I do not think we are still underestimating Ukraine's statehood. There is an appreciation of Ukraine's resilience and some parts of its governance and infrastructure – think, for instance, of the railways, which have become a symbol of its capacity. Having said that: When we moved beyond the initial awe and inspiration, we also saw that it is not some "miracle" state but a real one, where problems like corruption, a Soviet style of thinking, red tape, and favoritism still exist. There are efforts to fix them but such issues will not go away overnight, and definitely not in wartime. However, the decision on Ukraine joining the EU will not be about whether it can meet EU standards of governance. It clearly can. It will be a political one, and those states that object to EU membership should stop hiding behind excuses such as lack of proper governance and corruption.

STANDARD: You have also argued the Russian occupation of Bukovina and Eastern Galicia during World War I represents a carbon copy of what is happening today in the occupied territories of Ukraine, and essentially follows a long and repeating historical pattern set by Russia’s authoritarian rulers, be it monarchs, Bolsheviks or Putinists.

Finkel: It is not an exact carbon copy but the key patterns are very similar. Austro-Hungarian Galicia and Bukovyna were multi-ethnic regions, and the Russian government used that to achieve support for its rule. For instance, there was a plan to expropriate all Jewish land and give it to Ukrainian peasants. But when it came to how the Russian government viewed Ukrainian identity and history, the similarities are striking. The Czarist government viewed Galicia as ancient Russian land and the Ukrainians living there as Russians. It banned Ukrainian language publications, destroyed Ukrainian books, targeted Ukrainian artists, arrested Ukrainian community leaders, planned to annex the region to the Russian Empire fully, and sent teachers and bureaucrats to Russify the region. It also plundered, destroyed, and viewed the occupation as "unification" of the region with Russia, even though the vast majority of the population had no desire to become Russian subjects..

STANDARD: What needs to be done to break this pattern sustainably?

Finkel: The change can come only from within Russia. Firstly, Russians should stop viewing Ukraine as a historical part of Russia and Ukrainians as Russians who need to be liberated and unified with their "true motherland." That will be hard, but it is not impossible. In 1914, Russians viewed Galicia as part of historical Russia. Now, they no longer do. Even those Russians who want to fully annex Ukraine no longer wish to control Western Ukraine. The change should also come through education, culture and a change in Russians' perceptions of their national identity. Only when they start viewing Ukraine as a separate state populated by different people will there be sustainable peace. Unfortunately, I do not see this happening any time soon, but I am hopeful that this change will come in the future.

STANDARD: What would be the worst-case scenario for Ukraine if the current situation, which is increasingly perceived as a stalemate between the warring parties, continues for the foreseeable future??

Finkel: I think freezing the conflict or making it low-intensity would be the worst-case scenario for Ukraine. Ukraine will not be able to move on without a peace agreement or a victory. There will be no reconstruction. Many refugees will not come back. Foreigners will be too afraid to invest, and the government, instead of spending money on recovery, health care, education, and the economy, will have to keep investing in defense. A non-resolution will prevent Ukraine from receiving meaningful security guarantees or joining NATO. It will also harm its chances to join the EU. Sure, Cyprus did join the EU without solving its territorial conflict but Ukraine’s situation is much worse and more volatile. Finally, Ukraine will become a heavily militarized society that might even seek nuclear weapons to protect itself. And there will always be the possibility of a new major war because frozen conflicts, as we learned from Georgia and Nagorno-Karabakh, can easily unfreeze. Hence, a frozen conflict will be the worst-case scenario for everyone: for Ukraine, for the West, and even for Russia. The only one who will benefit from it will be Putin.

STANDARD: And what would be the worst-case scenario for Israel if the current situation continues for the foreseeable future?

Finkel: For Israel and the Palestinians, several scenarios would be bad, and I cannot even say which ones are the worst. I do not think that current Israeli violence in the Gaza Strip is genocidal in its intent, but I can easily imagine it becoming one. A continuation of the status quo where the war ends in a ceasefire, Hamas keeps ruling Gaza, right-wing extremists remain in power in Israel and keep promoting settlement in the West Bank, and democratic backsliding at home will eventually explode in mass violence, for instance a new Intifada. My only hope is that when this war is over there will be a renewed attempt to reach a durable solution and a peace agreement. That will be impossible if Hamas and the current Israeli government remain in power. To prevent a worst-case scenario, the extremists will have to go. However, I am not optimistic about that..

STANDARD: You are now active on Bluesky, while your account on Elon Musk's X (formerly Twitter) has gone dormant despite you having tens of thousands of followers there. Why did you quit X? And what do you tell colleagues who are still active there?

Finkel: I was very active on social media when Russia invaded Ukraine because this is a topic I know quite a lot about. But at some point the value of providing information and being active in the public square decreases. It is very important during the early stages when people need information, when they are making up their minds and listening. But by now, everyone who wanted to learn about Ukraine and Russia has done so, and there is much less for me to contribute. Concerning X: When its owner started trafficking in anti-Semitism and xenophobia, and his public statements became openly sympathetic to autocracy and autocratic regimes, there was no place for me on that platform anymore, and the number of followers I had on there played no role. I know people who are still active on X not because but despite Musk, and they believe they must keep informing the public and the community they built over the years on that platform. I understand and respect their choice, but I could not do it. I look forward to the moment when my expertise on war and mass violence is no longer needed, and then I will happily delete all my social media accounts. (Klaus Stimeder, 7.12.2023)